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HLD-040 (December 2009)

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4259
___________
IN RE: CHARLES J. SECHLER,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Criminal No. 03-cr-00032)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
December 30, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Charles J. Sechler filed this pro se petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 seeking an order compelling the District Court to appoint counsel of
his choice and to explain why he has not been allowed access to his current, courtappointed counsel. He also asks this Court to (1) send him his case file so he may
proceed pro se, (2) order his current counsel to explain why she has refused to represent
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him since he absconded, and (3) make an information request on his behalf. For the
reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition.
In 2007, Sechler was convicted of drug-related charges by a jury in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, but he fled to
Canada before he was sentenced. Sechler was arrested by Canadian authorities in 2008
and detained. It appears that Sechler claimed refugee status, which was denied, and that a
deportation order was issued in March 2008. It also appears that, to date, he remains in
detention in Canada. In the meantime, the criminal case is at a standstill: the District
Court has not sentenced Sechler in absentia and it appears from correspondence on that
court’s docket that it does not intend to move forward until Sechler returns to the
jurisdiction. In November 2009, Sechler filed a mandamus petition with this Court,
seeking the aforementioned relief. It appears that he is frustrated by what he deems his
court-appointed counsel’s “refusal to represent [him] in any capacity in the District
Court” since he fled to Canada.
The threshold question presented in this case is whether we should entertain
Sechler’s petition for mandamus relief regarding his criminal trial when he absconded
during that trial and remains beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Supreme
Court has recognized that courts have the power to dismiss a fugitive’s criminal appeal.
See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (a fugitive’s escape “disentitles
the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims”).
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The so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not, however, automatically disqualify
a criminal fugitive from maintaining a civil action in federal court. See Degen v. United
States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996) (holding that a district court could not apply the doctrine to
refuse a criminal fugitive’s answer in a related civil forfeiture case). In general, dismissal
of a civil action under the doctrine is appropriate where there is a sufficient connection
between the fugitive status and the civil action, and where the dismissal animates the
concerns underlying the doctrine. See Barnett v. YMCA, Inc., 268 F.3d 614, 618 (8th
Cir. 2001).
In this case, dismissal is appropriate for several reasons. First, there is a
direct connection between Sechler’s fugitive status and his mandamus petition. Sechler
fled during his criminal trial and, consequently, the trial stopped, yet he is attempting to
gain the means to continue to litigate via mandamus relief. Second, although entertaining
Sechler’s petition may not be a direct affront to the dignity of this Court, it is an affront to
the dignity of the District Court because Sechler is attempting to circumvent and flout the
authority of that court, which has decided to halt proceedings until he returns to its
jurisdiction. Cf. United States v. Awadalla, 357 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that
the Degen Court’s rationale that a criminal defendant should not be sanctioned by one
court for his affront to another has no application in criminal appeals). Finally, dismissal
is not an excessively harsh sanction. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 829; Maydak v. United
States Dep’t of Educ., 150 Fed. App’x 136, 138 (3d Cir. 2005). Regarding Sechler’s
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requests related to representation, the District Court and Sechler’s attorney have made
clear that both his trial and representation by court-appointed counsel will resume once he
returns to the court’s jurisdiction. As for his demand that this Court file an information
request on his behalf, relief in that form is not available through a petition for a writ of
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. And, in any event, Sechler may make the requests
himself to the appropriate agencies under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
et seq. (2006), and Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law, 65 P.S. § 67.101, et seq. (2009).
Accordingly, we will dismiss Sechler’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
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